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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Brief of Appellee Sullivan-Schein Dental Co. ("Sullivan") sets
forth no disagreement with the "Issues Presented for Review" Section of
Petitioner Susan Carter's ("Carter") principal Brief, nor has Sullivan
disputed that such issues were sufficiently preserved in the record.
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However, Sullivan's Brief contains a separate Statement of Issues Presented
for Review, which substantially deviates from Carter's statement of the
issues. Sullivan's statement of the issues omits some of the issues raised by
Carter, and misstates Carter's First Issue.1 Therefore, Carter submits that
her statement of the "Issues Presented for Review" more fully and accurately
sets forth the relevant issues in this Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The "Statement of the Case" Section of Sullivan's Brief, at page 5,
includes the following misstatement of fact:
Carter was involuntarily terminated on March 25,1998 after
two co-workers complained on separate occasions that she had
violated a Sullivan-Schein company directive that prohibited a
sales representative from soliciting ("poaching") an account not
assigned to them.

1

Sullivan phrases the First Issue as: "Whether the Board acted within its
statutory discretion in substituting itsfindingsand conclusions for those of
the Administrative Law Judge." (Sullivan's Brief, page 1). However, Carter
does not dispute that the Board generally has authority to substitute its
findings and conclusions for those of the ALJ. Carter contends that the
Board exceeded its authority by considering arguments that had not
previously been raised in the case, and by failing to consider the credibility
determinations made by the ALJ.
- 3 -

There is no evidence in this case that two coworkers accused
Carter of "poaching." The only alleged incident of poaching by Carter
occurred when she communicated with Dr. Clegg's office, after it was
assigned to sales representative Melanie Bingham ("Bingham"). The
circumstances involving that incident are set forth within Carter's principal
Brief, at pages 15-19.
The other significant incident in this case—which directly preceded
Carter's termination of employment— involved the Heritage Dental account.
However, It is undisputed that the Heritage Dental account was assigned to
Carter at the time of her termination. It is true that Carter's supervisor,
Joseph Sheutzow ("Scheutzow"), falsely claimed, as the basis for Carter's
termination, that Heritage Dental was not assigned to Carter. However, it is
also undisputed that Schetzow knew Heritage Dental was assigned to Carter
at the time of her termination. Heritage Dental was on Carter's run list, and
Carter told Scheutzow that Heritage Dental was her account at the time of
the termination. (Brief of Petitioner, Statement of Facts, Paras. 34-47).
Carter even offered to show Scheutzow her run list in order to prove that
Heritage Dental was her account, which Scheutzow refused. (Brief of
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Petitioner, Statement of Facts, Para. 44). Scheutzow's blatantly false
assertion cannot reasonably be described as a complaint by a co-worker that
Carter called on an account that was not assigned to her.
There was only one occasion on which Carter was accused by a coworker of calling on an account that was not assigned to her, i.e., the Dr.
Clegg account.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although Sullivan's Brief contains a lengthy Statement of Facts
section, it sets forth no disagreement with the Statement of Facts section of
the Brief of Petitioner. Sullivan's Statement of Facts contains the following
inaccurate or incomplete allegations:
1.

Sullivan's Brief states at page 8 that Parke Simmons

("Simmons") and Blaine Brown ("Brown") exercised no supervisory control
over Carter. However, the undisputed evidence in this case reflects that
Simmons and Brown exercised informal supervisory control over the sales
representatives, including Carter, during Scheutzow'sfrequentabsences. In

The Majority of the Appeals Board did not even mention the blatant
falsity of the reason that was given for Carter's termination in its decision in
this case.
-
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fact, the portion of Bingham's testimony that is cited by Sullivan supports
this conclusion. (Bingham Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 267269). The ALJ's Findings and Conclusions contain a detailed analysis of
this issue. (Appendix at 7). The Majority of the Appeals Board held that:
"Simmons and Brown would have no supervisory authority over Ms.
Carter." (Appendix at 28). However, the Majority of the Appeals Board did
not mention the possibility of informal authority, or address any of the facts
referenced by the ALJ on this issue.
2.

Sullivan's Brief states at page 8 that Carter never contacted

Sullivan's Vice President of Human Resources, Leonard David ("David") in
regard to any alleged retaliation. This is true. However, Carter repeatedly
complained to Sullivan's Director of Human Resources, Gary Anderson
("Anderson") concerning retaliation. (See Carter's Statement of Facts,
Paras. 33,48.) Carter also complained to Sullivan's President of the North
American Dental Group, James Stahly ("Stahly") concerning retaliation in
connection with her termination. (See Carter's Statement of Facts, Para. 49).
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3.

Sullivan's Brief states at page 13: "Carter was the subject of

three separate complaints from co-workers involving predatory behavior."
This allegation is false.
The alleged "three separate complaints" referred to by Sullivan
include Dr. Clegg's account and the Heritage Dental account. As discussed
within the preceding "Statement of the Case" section hereof, the Heritage
Dental incident cannot feasibly be described as "predatory behavior" on the
part of Carter, because she simply called on her own account.
The third alleged complaint regarding "predatory behavior" referred
to by Sullivan involved the account of Dr. Wesley Brooks ("Dr. Brooks").
However, it is undisputed that Dr. Brooks' account, like the Heritage Dental
account, was assigned to Carter at the time she called upon it. (Butler
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 242-243; Scheutzow Testimony,
March 28,2003 Transcript, p. 232). Dr. Brooks' account constituted a
"crossover," i.e., it was assigned to both Carter and Butler after the merger.
Therefore, Carter had as much right to call upon Dr. Brooks' account as did
Butler, and her calling upon the account cannot reasonably be described as
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"predatory." It is undisputed that Carter received no discipline for calling on
Dr. Brooks' account. (Scheutzow Testimony, June 10,2003 Transcript, pp.
67-68; Appendix at 285).
In an attempt to make Carter's contact with Dr. Brook's office appear
culpable, Sullivan's Brief alleges that Carter presented herself to Dr. Brooks
as "the Sullivan-Schein sales representative to the exclusion ofButler.''''
(Brief of Appellee, page 14)(emphasis added). There is no evidence that
Carter presented herself to Dr. Brooks as Sullivan's exclusive sales
representative, nor has that allegation previously been made.

ARGUMENT
I.

MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE.

Sullivan's Brief, at pages 20-23, asserts that Carter failed in her
obligation to marshal the evidence. However, Sullivan has not identified a
single fact, inference, or argument relied upon by the Majority of the
Appeals Board that Carter failed to address in her Brief. The Brief of
Petitioner at pages 28-32 sets forth each argument and item of evidence that
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the Appeals Board relied on in making its decision.
Sullivan further asserts that Carter failed to identify the "fatal flaw" in
the evidence relied upon the Majority of the Appeals Board. (Appellee's
Brief, page 23). Carter believes that her Brief clearly identifies several such
fatal flaws, specifically:
1.

The Appeals Board exceeded its statutory authority by relying

upon arguments that had never previously been raised in the case;
2.

The Appeals Board failed to apply the appropriate legal

standard;
3.

The Appeals Board failed to consider the credibility

determinations made by the ALJ; and
4.

The evidence relied upon by the Appeals Board, as a whole,

does not support its decision.
Each of these "fatal flaws" has been raised as an issue within the Brief
of Petitioner.
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II.

THE APPEALS BOARD EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN
CONSIDERING ARGUMENTS THAT WERE NOT
PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN THE CASE.

Sullivan does not dispute that the scope of review of the Appeals
Board is limited by Utah Code Section 34A-l-303(4)(c), which states:
The commissioner or the Appeals Board may base its decision
on:
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental
evidence requested by the commissioner or Appeals
Board.
Further, Sullivan does not dispute that, under Section 34A-l-303(4)(c),
the Appeals Board may not base its decision upon arguments that were not
previously raised in the case.
Carter contends that the decision of the Appeals Board
substantially relied upon two arguments that were not previously raised in
the case, specifically:
(1) that Sullivan's "prompt and appropriate action" in response to
Carter's letter negated a finding of subsequent retaliation, and
(2) that Sullivan's failure to investigate the details of the complaints
against Carter was "most reasonably attributable to: (1) wide-ranging
responsibilities of Sullivan managers; 2) disorganization and
-10-

confusion engendered by the merger; 3) the company's paramount concern
for the continuity of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive
nature of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (Appendix at 32).
Significantly, Sullivan's Brief does not dispute that these points were
first raised by the Appeals Board in its decision. Sullivan's only response on
this issue is to assert that the above-stated points constitute "facts" rather
than "arguments" and were, therefore, properly considered by the Appeals
Board.
The distinction between "facts" and "arguments" is not always
apparent, but it is reasonably clear in the present case. Specifically, it is an
undisputed^zef in this case that Sullivan took prompt action in response to
Carter's initial discrimination complaint. However, to infer that, because of
that prompt action, Sullivan did not subsequently engage in retaliation
against Carter is not a fact—it is an argument or legal conclusion.
Moreover, it is an argument that Sullivan never raised prior to the decision
of the Appeals Board. Even now, Sullivan does not assert that such a
conclusion is warranted. (See Appellee's Brief, pages 32-33). Sullivan
merely asserts that it is a fact, not an argument.
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Similarly, it is an undisputed^c/ in this case that Sullivan failed to
involve its Human Resources Department in either of the two disciplinary
actions that were taken against Carter. It is also an undisputed fact that,
under Sullivan's Discipline Policy, Human Resources was required to be
involved in all disciplinary actions. It is also an undisputed fact that
Sullivan experienced substantial confusion due to the merger at the time of
Carter's termination.
The Appeals Board's conclusion that Sullivan failed to involve its
Human Resources Department because of the confusion caused by the
merger might be construed as a finding of fact, if Sullivan had ever made
such an argument or submitted evidence in support thereof. However, at no
time prior to the Appeals Board's decision did Sullivan ever assert that its
failure to involve Human Resources was due to confusion caused by the
merger, or any of the other reasons that are cited by the Appeals Board. Nor
did Sullivan offer any evidence in support of such a conclusion.
Sullivan's Brief strenuously argues, at pages 33-37, that the merger
was confusing, that its managers did have wide-ranging responsibilities, etc.
However, this argument misses the point. Sullivan never asserted any of
-12-

these facts as the reason for its failure to involve Human Resources in
Carter's termination. The connection between Sullivan's failure to involve
Human Resources and the confusion caused by the merger, etc. constitutes
an argument or conclusion that was first made by the Appeals Board in its
decision.3
These "new arguments" were critical to the decision of the Appeals
Board. Without them, the decision cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the
decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed, and the decision of the
ALJ should be reinstated. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to
the Appeals Board for a decision that does not rely upon arguments that
were not raised by the parties during the case.

3

Carter's characterization of the Appeals Board's decision on this
issue as an "argument" rather than a factual finding is supported by the
language used by the Appeals Board. The Appeals Board stated that
Sullivan's "failure to investigate the details of the complaints against Ms.
Carter is most reasonably attributable to" the listed factors. (Appendix at
32)(emphasis added). Notably, the Appeals Board did not state that such a
conclusion was based upon the evidence presented in the case. The Appeals
Board simply surmised that such a conclusion was "most reasonable."
- 13 -

III.

THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER
LEGAL STANDARD IN DETERMINING CARTER'S
RETALIATION CLAIM.

Carter contends that the Appeals Board effectively imposed two legal
requirements upon Carter that are not supported by controlling legal
authority. First, that Carter prove Sullivan failed to take prompt and
effective remedial action in response to her underlying discrimination
complaint in order to establish her claim of retaliation. Second, that Carter's
underlying discrimination complaint allege contemporaneous acts of
discrimination in order to support a claim of retaliaiton.
Sullivan's sole response on this issue is to assert that the Appeals
Board did not impose these two factors as elements of Carter's claim, but
only as evidence on the element of causation. (Brief of Appellee, pages 2730). Sullivan also generally asserts that the Appeals Board properly
considered these factors on the issue of causation, although Sullivan
provides no analysis or authority in support of such assertion.
It is true that the Appeals Board presented its consideration of these
issues within its analysis of the causation element. (Appendix at 31-32).

-14-

However, Carter submits that these issues are more properly characterized as
additional elements that the Appeals Board imposed upon Carter, for the
following reasons:
First, an employer's failure to take prompt and effective remedial
action is a recognized element of claims alleging protected class
discrimination. Curran v. AMI Fireplace Co.. No. 04-1362 (10th Cir. 2006);
Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995).
Sullivan acknowledges this rule on page 29 of its Brief.4 It would be
inconsistent to make prompt and effective remedial action an element of
protected class discrimination claims, but only a factor relating to causation
in retaliation cases.
Second, the rule adopted by the Appeals Board—that an employer's
prompt response to an underlying discrimination complaint negates or
diminishes an inference of subsequent retaliation, would have such far
reaching consequences that it would, for all practical purposes, create an
additional element, or at least substantially modify the causation element, in
all retaliation cases. The Appeals Board did not indicate that its application
4

Specifically, Sullivan acknowledges that an employer's prompt and
effective remedial action constitutes an affirmative defense in discriminatory
harassment cases. Sullivan never alleged such an affirmative defense in this
case.
-
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of the prompt and effective remedial action rule is limited to the present
case. The Appeals Board has adopted a far-reaching new rule that
substantially alters the requirements for proving retaliation claims. If the
decision of the Appeals Board in this case is affirmed, it may reasonably be
expected that claimants in future retaliation cases will be required to prove
their employers failed to take prompt and effective remedial action in
response to their underlying discrimination complaints.
The same analysis applies to the second factor cited above. An
employee's involvement in protected opposition to discrimination is an
established element in retaliation claims. However, to Carter's knowledge,
no court has suggested that the protected opposition has to be to
contemporaneous discrimination in order to receive protection against
retaliation. Such a rule would substantially modify the "protected
opposition" element in all cases where the underlying discrimination might
be considered non-contemporaneous. The Appeals Board did not suggest
this rule is limited to the present case. It has effectively modified the
"protected opposition" element through the guise of its causation analysis.
Unless this rule accurately states the law within the State of Utah, the
decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed.
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IV.

THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ AS TO CREDIBILITY.

Sullivan does not dispute that the decision of the ALJ in this case was
substantially based upon credibility determinations. (See Brief of Appellee,
pages 23-26). Nor does Sullivan dispute that the Majority of the Appeals
Board completely disregarded the credibility determinations of the ALJ. In
fact, the Appeals Board did not even mention credibility as an issue in the
case.
Sullivan seems to argue that the Appeals Board was within its rights
to simply disregard the credibility findings of the ALJ in this case.
However, such position is contrary to this Court's ruling in Vali
Convalescent and Care Inst, v. Div. of Health Care Financing. 797 P.2d 438
(Utah App. 1990). In Vali Convalescent, a DOH hearing officer determined
that Vali had not intended to settle its claim for interest allegedly owed to it
by DOH. Such determination was substantially based upon the hearing
officer's assessment of the witnesses' credibility.
Upon review, the hearing officer's decision was reversed by the
Division's Executive Director. The Executive Director purported to adopt
the findings of the hearing officer, but substituted her own factual
-17-

conclusions which led to a different result. The Executive Director did not
explain her reasons for reaching a different conclusion than the hearing
officer. Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 445.
Upon appeal, this Court first reviewed the Utah case precedents and
found them to be inconclusive. Vali Convalescent. 797 P.2d at 445-446.
This Court then reviewed two cases from other jurisdictions. First, the Court
quoted Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Sandoval. 742 P.2d 492 (Idsiho App.
1987), as stating:
[C]ommon sense indicates that in weighing the reasonableness
of the Commission's findings, a court cannot wholly disregard
the hearing officer's impressions drawnfromfirst-hand
exposure to the witnesses. The report of the hearing officer is
part of the entire record embraced by judicial review.
The Vali Convalescent court proceeded to describe the decision in
Sandoval as follows:
The [Sandoval] court did not suggest that the Commission had
to accept the determinations of the hearing officer but that
where credibility is crucial and where first —hand exposure to
the witnesses may strongly effect the outcome, we think the
Personnel Commission should not override the hearing
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent explanation of its
reasons for doing so. Such an explanation is essential to
meaningful judicial review, and it is a logical adjunct to the
Commission's statutory duty to supplement its decision with
findings of fact and Conclusions of law. Vali Convalescent
797P.2dat447.
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The Vali Convalescent court then discussed the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951), which was relied upon by the Sandoval court, as follows:
The Universal Camera Court stated that the examiner's findings
should be considered as part of the whole record on appeal. It
noted that the examiner'sfindings,which were based upon
personal observation of the witnesses, might tend to negate the
reasonableness of the contrary findings and Conclusions of the
reviewing agency board. The Court found this to be
particularly true where witness credibility was important to the
case. Vali Convalescent. 797 P.2d at 447.
In conclusion, the Vali Convalsecnt court stated that it was persuaded
by Sandoval, and remanded the case to the executive director to make
findings "sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
factual Conclusions.. .are reached." Vali Convalescent. 797 P.2d at 447.
The court then stated: "Where, as here, the hearing officer'sfindingswere
apparently based to a large extent upon his credibility determinations, and
the executive director took no live testimony, it is even more important for
the executive director to adequately detail her reasons for reaching a
different result." Qd).(emphasis added).
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In the present case, the ALJ heard live testimony from numerous
witnesses, much of which was disputed or conflicting. The ALJ then
entered extensive findings of fact. It is undisputed that the ALJ's findings
include several credibility determinations. Additionally, the ALJ found that
Sullivan's professed reason for terminating Carter—soliciting accounts that
were not her own—was pretextual, in that Sullivan's managers either knew
that Carter was not soliciting such accounts, or deliberately avoided
information that justified Carter's actions. (Appendix at 16-18). The ALJ
also found that Carter was subjected to disparate treatment, i.e., that only
Carter received discipline in relation to the crossover problems that, were
experienced by all of the sales representatives. (Id).
The Order of the Appeals Board provides no reason whatsoever for
rejecting the ALJ's findings. It simply states: "The Appeals Board sets aside
Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact and enters the following findings."
(Appendix at 27). After that, the Appeals Board makes no reference at all to
the ALJ's findings of fact. The Appeals Board does not even mention any
credibility issues. Nor does the Appeals Board address the ALJ's findings
that Sullivan's professed reason for Carter's termination was pretextual. The
-20-

Appeals Board's Order states: "[We are] persuaded that Sullivan-Schein
management likewise believed that Ms. Carter violated rules of conduct
when it took action against her." (Appendix at 31). However, the Appeals
Board provides no reasoning and cites no evidence in support of this
conclusion. The Appeals Board completely disregarded all of the evidence
upon which the ALJ relied infindingpretext, including the fact that the
professed reason for the termination was blatantly false. The Appeals Board
also completely overlooked the disparate treatment Carter received in
relation to the crossover problems.
Where a reviewing agency fails to make its own findings, it is
presumed that it has adopted the findings of the administrative law judge.
Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 446. The Appeals Board in the present case,
having completely failed to address the ALJ's findings in regard to
credibility, pretext and disparate treatment, should be presumed to have
adopted such findings. Based upon those findings, the decision of the
Appeals Board should be reversed and judgment entered in Carter's favor.

-21-

V.

THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD.

Pages 42-49 of Carter's principal Brief describe in detail how the
decision of the Appeals Board is not supported by substantial evidence in
this case. Sullivan's Brief fails to respond to these arguments.
First, Sullivan does not dispute that this Court should provide only
limited deference to the decision of the Appeals Board in this case, due to
the lack of Agency expertise, the split decision of the Appeals Board, and
the ALJ's personal observation of the witnesses.
The Majority of the Appeals Board based its decision in this case
upon the following factors:
(a)

The Appeals Board found that Sullivan took "prompt and

appropriate action" in response to Carter's letter, thereby indicating that her
letter was not a motivating factor for her termination. (R. 934). Sullivan's
Brief, at pages 28-29, asserts that the Appeals Board was justified in
reaching this conclusion. However, neither Sullivan nor the Appeals Board
has provided any analysis in support of such conclusion, or cited any
supporting legal authority.
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(b)

The Appeals Board found that Carter's letter complaining of

gender discrimination dealt with events several years past and at a different
employer, thereby indicating that her letter was not a motivating factor for
her termination. Sullivan's Brief, at page 30, asserts the Appeals Board was
justified in reaching this conclusion. However, neither Sullivan nor the
Appeals Board has provided any analysis in support of such conclusion, or
cited any supporting legal authority.
(c).

The Appeals Board found that the sales representatives who

complained about Carter did not know about Carter's letter. Carter argued
in her principal Brief that this fact is immaterial, because only the state of
mind of Sullivan's managers is relevant in this case. Sullivan's Brief does
not address this issue.
(d)

The Appeals Board found that: "Sullivan-Schein management

likewise believed that Ms. Carter had violated rules of conduct when it took
action against her." (See Appendix at 31). However, the Appeals Board
cited no evidence in support of this blanket assertion, and completely
disregarded all of the extensive evidence to the contrary.
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(e)

The Appeals Board found that a complaint was made by Butler

against Carter regarding the account of Dr. Brooks. Carter's principal Brief,
at page 46, notes that Dr. Brooks' account was assigned to Carter, and that
she never received any discipline for calling on his account.

Sullivan's

Brief, at pages 14-15, asserts that Dr. Brook's account was part of a pattern
of "predatory behavior" on the part of Carter, but ignores the undisputed
evidence that Carter was within her rights to call on such account, and that
she received no discipline in relation thereto.
(f)

The Appeals Board found that Sullivan's failure to discuss the

crossover complaints with Carter, or to involve Human Resources in
Carter's disciplinary actions, were excused by the following factors:
1) wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein managers;
2) disorganization and confusion engendered by the merger;
3) the company's paramount concern for the continuity of its
newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive nature of the
complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (Appendix at 31).
Carter's principal Brief, at page 47, argues that there is no evidence of
any connection between the listed factors and Sullivan's failure to discuss
the crossover issues with Carter or Human Resources. Further, Sullivan
never asserted any of such factors as an excuse prior to the Appeals Board's
decision. Sullivan's Brief, at pages 34-37, asserts that the above-listed
-24-

factors are supported by evidence. However, Sullivan's argument misses the
relevant point, which is the connection between the listed factors and
Sullivan's failure to discuss the complaints with Carter or to involve Human
Resources. There is no evidence of such a connection, nor did Sullivan
assert that such a connection exists. Further, the Appeals Board did not
consider evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the listed factors did not
prevent Sullivan from taking prompt and effective action in response to
Carter's initial complaint. Further, the listed factors would not reasonably
prevent Sullivan management from discussing the issues with Carter or
Human Resources.
(g)

Carter's principal Brief, at pages 48-49, notes that the Appeals

Board substantially misconstrued Sullivan's policy regarding crossover
accounts during the relevant time period. The Appeals Board's summary of
such policy (Appendix at 28-29) fails to mention that the sales
representatives were initially told to pursue "business as usual," i.e., call
upon the same accounts that they had called upon before the merger. It was
this policy that led to the crossover problems, and this policy remained
substantially in effect until after Carter's termination. Sullivan's Brief does
not address this issue.
-25-

Finally, Sullivan's Brief argues, at page 31, that the decision of the
Appeals Board was based upon "multiple pieces of evidence," and that
Carter has attacked only "individual pieces of the Board's findings."
In fact, Carter has revealed the "fatal flaw" in each item of evidence
upon which the Appeals Board relied in support of its decision. Sullivan has
not identified any evidence or arguments that Carter failed to take into
consideration.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, Carter
requests that the decision of the Appeals Board in this case be reversed, and
that judgment be entered in favor of Carter. Carter also requests that she be
awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this Appeal.
Respectfully submitted this L I

day of April, 2006.

Kenneth B. Grimes
^^
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief for
Petitioner were served by hand-delivery upon each of the following persons
this 2-1

day of April, 2006:
Alan L. Hennebold
160 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Mark O. Morris
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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